

The Presidency and the Political System

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Michael Nelson, Editor
Rhodes College



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- | | |
|----|----|
| 1 | 2 |
| 3 | 4 |
| 5 | 6 |
| 7 | 8 |
| 9 | 10 |
| 11 | 12 |
| 13 | 14 |
| 15 | 16 |
1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
 2. William Howard Taft loses first baseball, 1910, Library of Congress
 3. Abraham Lincoln with companions, Library of Congress
 4. Lyndon B. Johnson with Senate leaders, courtesy Lyndon Baines Johnson Library

5. Bill Clinton and Al Gore with congressional leaders, Associated Press
6. George Washington's inaugural address, 1789, mezzotint by H. S. Sudd.
7. Woodrow Wilson addresses Congress, 1916, Library of Congress
8. President Bush promotes House health care legislation, Michael Jenkins
9. Theodore Roosevelt with leaders after Russo-Japanese War, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Harvard College Library
10. Richard Nixon with Chinese officials at the Great Wall of China, Nixon Project/National Archives
11. John F. Kennedy at joint session of Congress, photo # St-C7-2-63 in the John F. Kennedy Library
12. Air Force One, The White House
13. Jimmy Carter in Oval Office, The White House
14. Ulysses S. Grant, Library of Congress
15. Ronald and Nancy Reagan at Camp David, Bill Ritz-Patrick, The White House
16. Franklin D. Roosevelt at press conference, Library of Congress

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To my beloved wife, Linda.

She opens her mouth with wisdom,
and the teaching of kindness is on her tongue....

Her children rise up and call her blessed;
her husband also, and he praises her.

PROVERBS 31:26, 28

7 The Psychological Presidency

Michael Nelson

Several delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 noted during the first week of debate that to invest enormous power in a one-person office was to invest enormous power in one person. Not until James David Barber wrote *The Presidential Character*, however, was a systematic effort made to explore the psychological consequences of that important truism. Michael Nelson examines this influential book, along with another that Barber wrote about the voters' supposed contributions to the "psychological presidency," called *The Pulse of Politics*. Although Nelson finds Barber's theories wanting (the healthier of Barber's character types, for example, are not always successful presidents), he praises Barber for drawing attention to the psychological aspects of the presidency and for encouraging political journalists to do the same in their coverage of presidential campaigns.

The United States elects its president every four years, which makes it unique among democratic nations. During several recent election campaigns, *Time* magazine has run a story about James David Barber, which makes him equally singular among political scientists. The two quadrennial oddities are not unrelated.

The first *Time* article was about Barber's just published book, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, in which he argued that presidents could be divided into four psychological types: "active-positive," "active-negative," "passive-positive," and "passive-negative." What's more, according to Barber via *Time*, by taking "a hard look at men before they reach the White House," voters could tell in advance what candidates would be like if elected: healthily "ambitious out of exuberance," like the active-positives; or pathologically "ambitious out of anxiety," "compliant and other-directed," or "dutiful and self-denying," like the three other, lesser types, respectively. In the 1972 election, Barber told *Time*, the choice was between an active-positive,

George McGovern, and a psychologically defective active-negative, Richard M. Nixon.¹

Nixon won the election, but Barber's early insights into Nixon's personality won notoriety for both him and his theory, especially in the wake of Watergate. So prominent had Barber become by 1976 that Hugh Sides used his entire "Presidency" column in the October 4 issue of *Time* to tell readers that Barber was refusing to type candidates Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter this time around. "Barber is deep into an academic study of this election and its participants, and he is pledged to restraint until it is over," Sides reported solemnly.² (Actually, more than a year before, Barber had told interviewers from *U.S. News & World Report* that he considered Ford an active-positive.)³ Carter, who read Barber's book twice when it came out, was left to tell the *Washington Post* that active-positive is "what I would like to be. That's what I hope I prove to be."⁴ And so Carter would be, wrote Barber in a special postelection column for *Time*:⁵

The 1980 election campaign witnessed the appearance of another Barber book, *The Pulse of Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age*, and in honor of the occasion, two *Time* articles. This was all to the good, because the first, a Sidesy column in March, offered more gush than information: "The first words encountered in the new book by Duke's Professor James David Barber are stunning: 'A revolution in presidential politics is under way' . . . Barber has made political history before."⁶ A more substantive piece in the magazine's May 19 "Nation" section described the new book's cycle theory of twentieth-century presidential elections: since 1900, steady four-year beats in the public's psychological mood, or "pulse," have caused a recurring alternation among elections of "conflict," "conscience," and "conciliation." *Time* went on to stress, although not explain, Barber's view of the importance of the mass media, both as a reinforcer of this cycle and as a potential mechanism for helping the nation to break out of it.⁷

In 1984, 1988, and 1992, Barber wrote for and was written about in numerous other national publications. But it was *Time*'s infatuation with Barber that brought him a level of fame that comes rarely to scholars, more rarely still to political scientists. For Barber, fame has come at some cost. Although widely known, his ideas are little understood. The media's cursory treatment of them has made them appear superficial or even foolish—instantly appealing to the naive, instantly odious to the thoughtful. Partly as a result, Barber's reputation in the intellectual community as an *hominie sérieux* has suffered. In the backrooms and corridors of scholarly gatherings, one hears "journalistic" and "pop-

ularizer," the worst academic epithets, muttered along with his name. Indeed, in a 1991 assessment of recent scholarly research on the presidency, Paul Quirk observed of the whole field of presidential psychology that "researchers seem to have kept their distance from the subject as if to avoid guilt by association" with Barber.⁸

This situation is in need of remedy. Barber's theories may be seriously flawed, but they are serious theories. For all their limitations—some of them self-confessed—they offer one of the more significant contributions a scholar can make: an unfamiliar but useful way of looking at a familiar thing that we no longer see very clearly. In Barber's case, the familiar thing is the American presidency, and the unfamiliar way of looking at it is through the lenses of psychology.

Psychological Perspectives on the Presidency

Constitutional Perspectives

To look at politics in general, or the American presidency in particular, from a psychological perspective is not new. Although deprived of the insights (and spared the nonsense) of twentieth-century psychology, the framers of the Constitution constructed their plan of government on a foundation of Hobbesian assumptions about what motivates *homo politicus*. (They called what they were doing moral philosophy, not psychology.) James Madison and most of his colleagues at the Constitutional Convention assumed that "men are instruments of their desires"; that "one such desire is the desire for power"; and that "if unrestrained by external checks, any individual or group of individuals will tyrannize over others."⁹ Because the framers believed these things, a basic tenet of their political philosophy was that the government they were designing should be a "government of laws and not of men."¹⁰ Not just psychology but history had taught them to associate liberty with law and tyranny with rulers who depart from law, as had George III and his colonial governors.

In the end the convention yielded to those who urged, on grounds of "energy in the executive," that the Constitution lodge the powers of the executive branch in a single person, the president.¹¹ There are several explanations for why the framers were willing to put aside their doubts and inject such a powerful dose of individual "character" (in both the moral and the psychological senses of the word) into their new plan of government. One is the framers' certain knowledge that George Washington would be the first president. They knew that Washington aroused powerful and, from the standpoint of winning

the nation's support for the new government, vital psychological responses from the people. As Seymour Martin Lipset has shown, Washington was a classic example of Max Weber's charismatic leader, a man "treated [by the people] as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."¹² Marcus Cunliffe notes:

[B]abies were being christened after him as early as 1775, and while he was still President, his countrymen paid to see him in waxwork effigy. To his admirers he was "godlike Washington," and his detractors complained to one another that he was looked upon as a "demi-god" whom it was treasonous to criticize. "Oh Washington!" declared Ezra Stiles of Yale (in a sermon of 1783). "How I do love thy name! How have I often adored and blessed thy God, for creating and forming thee the great ornament of human kind!"¹³

Just as Washington's "gift of grace" would legitimize the new government, the framers believed, so would his personal character ensure its republican nature. The powers of the president in the Constitution "are full great," wrote Pierce Butler, a convention delegate from South Carolina, to a British kinsman, and greater than I was disposed to make them. Nor, *entre nous*, do I believe they would have been so great had not many of the delegates cast their eyes towards General Washington as President; and shaped their Ideas of the Powers to be given to a President, by their opinions of his Virtue.¹⁴

The framers were not so naive or shortsighted as to invest everything in Washington. To protect the nation from power-mad tyrants after he left office, they provided that the election of presidents, whether by electors or members of the House of Representatives, would involve selection by peers—personal acquaintances of the candidates who could screen out those of defective character. And even if someone of low character slipped through the net and became president, the framers believed that they had structured the office to protect the nation from harm. "The founders' deliberation over the provision for indefinite reeligibility," writes Jeffrey Tulis, "illustrates how they believed self-interest could sometimes be elevated."¹⁵ Whether motivated by "avarice," "ambition," or "the love of fame," argued Alexander Hamilton in the *Federalist*, a president will behave responsibly in order to secure reelection to the office that allows that desire to be fulfilled.¹⁶ Underlying this confidence was the assurance that in a relatively slow-paced world, a mad or wicked president could do only so much damage before corrective action could remove him. As John Jay explained, "So far as the fear of punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachment."¹⁶

The framers' decision to inject personality into the presidency was a conscious one. But it was made for reasons that eventually ceased to pertain, the last of them crumbling on August 6, 1945, when on orders of an American president, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The destructive powers at a modern president's disposal are ultimate and swift; the impeachment process now seems uncertain and slow. Peer review never took hold in the Electoral College. The rise of the national broadcast media makes the president's personality all the more pervasive. In sum, the framers' carefully conceived defenses against a president of defective character are gone.

Clearly, then, a sophisticated psychological perspective on the presidency was overdue in the late 1960s, when Barber began offering one in a series of articles and papers that culminated in *The Presidential Character*.¹⁹ Presidential scholars had long taken it as axiomatic that the American presidency is an institution shaped in some measure by the personalities of individual presidents. But rarely had the literature of personality theory been brought to bear, in large part because scholars of the post-Franklin D. Roosevelt period no longer seemed to share the framers' assumptions about human nature, at least as far as the presidency was concerned. As we saw in Chapter 1, historians and political scientists exalted not only presidential power but also presidents who were ambitious for power. Richard Neustadt's influential book, *Presidential Power*, published in 1960, was typical in this regard:

The contributions that a president can make to government are indispensable. Assuming that he knows what power is and wants it, those contributions cannot help but be forthcoming in some measure as by-products of his search for personal influence.¹⁸

As Erwin Hargrove reflected in post-Vietnam, post-Watergate 1974, this line of reasoning was the source of startling deficiencies in scholarly understandings of the office: "We had assumed that ideological purpose was sufficient to purify the drive for power, but we forgot the importance of character."¹⁹

Scholars also had recognized for some time that Americans' attitudes about the presidency, like presidents' actions, are psychologically as well as politically rooted. Studies of schoolchildren indicated that they first come into political awareness by learning of, and feeling fondly toward, the president. As adults, they "rally" to the president's support, both when they inaugurate a new one and in times of crisis.²⁰ Popular nationalistic emotions, which in constitutional monarchies are directed toward the king or queen, are deflected in American

society onto the presidency. Again, however, scholars' awareness of these psychological forces manifested itself more in casual observations (Dwight D. Eisenhower was a "father figure"; the "public mood" is fickle) than in systematic thought.

The presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Nixon altered this scholarly quiescence. Surveys taken shortly after the Kennedy assassination recorded the startling depth of the feelings that citizens have about the presidency. A large share of the population experienced symptoms classically associated with grief over the death of a loved one. Historical evidence suggests that the public has responded similarly to the deaths of all sitting presidents, popular or not, by murder or natural causes.²¹

If Kennedy's death illustrated the deep psychological ties of the public to the presidency, the experiences of his successors showed even more clearly the importance of psychology in understanding the connection between president and presidency. Johnson, the peace candidate who rigidly pursued a self-defeating policy of war, and Nixon, who promised "lower voices" only to angrily turn political disagreements into personal crises, projected their personalities onto policy in ways that were both obvious and destructive. The events of this period brought students of the presidency up short. As they paused to consider the "psychological presidency," they found Barber standing at the ready with the foundation and first floor of a full-blown theory.

James David Barber and the Psychological Presidency

Barber's theory offers a model of the presidency as an institution shaped largely by the psychological mix between the personalities of individual presidents and the public's deep feelings about the office. It also proposes methods of predicting what those personalities and feelings are likely to be in particular circumstances. These considerations govern *The Presidential Character* and *The Pulse of Politics*, books that we shall examine in turn. The question of how we can become masters of our own and of the presidency's psychological fate is also treated in these books, but it receives fuller exposition in other works by Barber.

Presidential Psychology

The primary danger of the Nixon administration will be that the President will grasp some line of policy or method of operation and pursue it in spite of its failure. . . . How will Nixon respond to challenges to the morality of his regime, to charges of scandal and/or corruption? First such charges strike a raw nerve, not

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only from the Checkers business, but also from deep within the personality in which the demands of the superego are so harsh and hard. . . . The first impulse will be to hush it up, to conceal it, bring down the blinds. If it breaks open and Nixon cannot avoid commenting on it, there is a real setup here for another crisis.

James David Barber is more than a little proud of that prediction, mainly because he made it in a talk he gave at Stanford University on January 19, 1969, the eve of Nixon's first inauguration. It was among the first in a series of speeches, papers, and articles whose purpose was to explain his theory of presidential personality and how to predict it, always with his forecast for Nixon's future prominently, and thus riskily, displayed. The theory received its fullest statement in *The Presidential Character*.

"Character" in Barber's usage, is not quite a synonym for personality.²² A politician's psychological constitution also includes two other components: an adolescence-born "worldview," which Barber defines as "primary, politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts of the time"; and a "style," or "habitual way of performing three political roles: rhetoric, personal relations, and homework," which develops in early adulthood. But clearly Barber considers character, which forms in childhood and shapes the later development of style and worldview, to be "the most important thing to know about a president or candidate." As he defines the term, "character is the way the President orients himself toward life—not for the moment but enduringly." It "grows out of the child's experiments in relating to parents, brothers and sisters, and peers at play and in school, as well as to his own body and the objects around it." Through these experiences, the child—and thus the adult to be—arrives subconsciously at a deep and private understanding of fundamental self-worth.

For some, this process results in high self-esteem, the vital ingredient for psychological health and political productivity. Others must search outside themselves for evidence of worth that at best will be a partial substitute. Depending on the source and nature of their limited self-esteem, Barber suggests, they will concentrate their search in one of three areas: the affection from others that compliant and agreeable behavior brings, the sense of usefulness that comes from performing a widely respected duty, or the deference attendant with dominance and control over other people. Because politics is a vocation rich in opportunities to find all three of these things—affection from cheering crowds and backslapping colleagues, usefulness from public service in a civic cause, dominance through official power—it is not surprising that some insecure people are attracted to a political career.

This makes for a problem, Barber argues: if public officials, especially presidents, use their office to compensate for private doubts and demons, it follows that they will not always use it for public purposes. Affection-seekers will be so concerned with preserving the goodwill of those around them that they seldom will challenge the status quo or otherwise rock the boat. The duty-doers will be similarly inert, although in their case inertia will result from their feeling that to be useful they must be diligent guardians of time-honored practices and procedures. Passive presidents of both kinds may provide the nation with "breathing spells, times of recovery in our frantic political life," or even "a refreshing hopefulness and at least some sense of sharing and caring." Still, in Barber's view, their main effect is to "divert popular attention from the hard realities of politics," thus leaving the country to "drift." And "what passive presidents ignore, active presidents inherit."²³

Power-driven presidents pose the greatest danger. They will seek their psychological compensation not in inaction but in intense efforts to maintain or extend their personal sense of domination and control through public channels. When things are going well for power-driven presidents and they feel they have the upper hand on their political opponents, there may be no problem. But when things cease to go their way, as eventually things will in a democratic system, such a president's response almost certainly will take destructive forms, such as rigid defensiveness or aggression against opponents. Only those with high self-esteem will be secure enough to lead as democratic political leaders must lead, with persuasion and flexibility as well as action and initiative.

Perhaps more important than the theoretical underpinnings of Barber's character analysis is the practical purpose that animates *The Presidential Character*: to help citizens choose their presidents wisely. The book's first words herald this purpose:

When a citizen votes for a presidential candidate he makes, in effect, a prediction. He chooses from among the contenders the one he thinks (or feels, or guesses) would be the best president. . . . This book is meant to help citizens and those who advise them cut through the confusion and get at some clear criteria for choosing presidents.

How, though, in the heat and haste of a presidential election, with candidates notably unwilling to bare their souls for psychological inspection, are we to find out what they are really like? Easy enough, argues Barber. To answer the difficult question of what motivates a political leader, just answer two simpler questions in its stead: Active or Passive? ("How much energy does the man

invest in his presidency?); and Positive or Negative? ("Relatively speaking, does he seem to experience his political life as happy or sad, enjoyable or discouraging, positive or negative in its main effect?") According to Barber, the four possible combinations of answers to these questions turn out to be almost synonymous with the four psychological strategies that people use to enhance self-esteem. The active-positives are the healthy ones in the group. Their high sense of self-worth enables them to work hard at politics, have fun at what they do, and thus be fairly good at it. Of the four eighteenth- and nineteenth-century presidents and the sixteen twentieth-century presidents whom Barber has typed, he places Thomas Jefferson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Kennedy, Ford, Carter, George Bush, and Bill Clinton in this category. The passive-positives (James Madison, William H. Taft, Warren G. Harding, Ronald Reagan) are the affection-seekers; although not especially hard-working, they enjoy the office. The passive-negatives (Washington, Calvin Coolidge, Eisenhower) neither work nor play; it is duty, not pleasure or zest, that gets them into politics. Finally, there are the power-seeking active-negatives, who compulsively and with little satisfaction throw themselves into their presidential chores.

In Barber's view, active-negative presidents John Adams, Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Johnson, and Nixon all shared one important personality-rooted quality: they persisted in disastrous courses of action (Adams's repulsive Alien and Sedition acts, Wilson's League of Nations battle, Hoover's depression policy, Johnson's Vietnam, Nixon's Watergate) because to have conceded error would have been to cede their sense of control, something their psychological constitutions would not allow them to do. Table 7.1 summarizes Barber's four types and his categorizations of individual presidents.

Not surprisingly, *The Presidential Character* was extremely controversial when it came out in 1972. Many argued that Barber's theory was too simple, that his four types did not begin to cover the range of human complexity. At one level, this criticism is as trivial as it is true. In spelling out his theory, Barber states clearly that "we are talking about tendencies, broad directions; no individual man exactly fits a category." His typology is offered as a method for sizing up potential presidents, not for diagnosing and treating them. Given the nature of election campaigning, a reasonably accurate shorthand device is about all we can hope for. The real question, then, is whether Barber's shorthand device is reasonably accurate.

Barber's intellectual defense of his typology's soundness, quoted here in full, is not altogether comforting:

Table 7.1. Barber's Character Typology with Presidents Categorized According to Type

Energy directed toward the Presidency	Affect toward the Presidency	
	Positive	Negative
Active	Thomas Jefferson Franklin Roosevelt Harry Truman John Kennedy Gerald Ford Jimmy Carter George Bush Bill Clinton	John Adams Woodrow Wilson Herbert Hoover Lyndon Johnson Richard Nixon
Passive	James Madison William Taft Warren Harding Ronald Reagan	George Washington Calvin Coolidge Dwight Eisenhower
	"receptive, compliant, other-directed character whose life is a search for affection as a reward for agreeable and cooperative... low self-esteem (on grounds of being unlovable)."	"low self-esteem based on a sense of uselessness... in politics because they think they ought to be... tendency is to withdraw, to escape from the conflict and uncertainty of politics by emphasizing vague principles (especially prohibitions) and procedural arrangements."

Sources: Barber's discussions of all presidents but Clinton are in *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*, 4th ed. (Langewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983). Clinton is characterized by Barber in Doyle McManus, "Key Challenges Await Clinton," *Los Angeles Times*, January 20, 1993, A6.

Why might we expect these two simple dimensions [active-passive, positive-negative] to outline the main character types? Because they stand for two central features of anyone's orientation toward life. In nearly every study of personality, some form of the active-passive contrast is critical; the general tendency to act or be acted upon is evident in such concepts as dominance-submission, extraversion-introversion, aggression-timidity, attack-defense, fight-flight engagement-withdrawal, approach-avoidance. In every life we sense quickly the general energy

output of the people we deal with. Similarly we catch on fairly quickly to the affect dimension—whether the person seems to be optimistic or pessimistic, hopeful or skeptical, happy or sad. The two baselines are clear and they are also independent of one another: all of us know people who are very active but seem discouraged, others who are quite passive but seem happy, and so forth. The activity baseline refers to what one does, the affect baseline to how one feels about what he does. Both are crude clues to character. They are leads into four basic character patterns long familiar in psychological research.²⁴

In the library copy of *The Presidential Character* from which I copied this passage, there is a handwritten note in the margin: "Footnote, man!" But there was no footnote to the psychological literature, here or anywhere else in the book. Casual readers might take this to mean that none was necessary, and they would be right if Barber's types really were "long familiar in psychological research" and "appeared in nearly every study of personality."²⁵ But they aren't and they don't, as Alexander George has pointed out, personality theory itself is a "quagmire" in which "the term 'character' in practice is applied loosely and means many different things."²⁶ Barber's real defense of his theory—that it works, witness Nixon—is not to be dismissed, but one wishes he had explained better why he thinks it works.²⁷

Interestingly, Barber's typology also has been criticized for not being simple enough, at least not for purposes of accurate preselection application. Where, exactly, is one to look to decide if deep down, candidate Jones is the energetic, buoyant person her image makers say she is? Barber is quite right to warn analysts away from their usual hunting ground—the candidate's recent performances in other high offices. These offices "are all much more restrictive than the Presidency is, much more set by institutional requirements,"²⁸ and thus much less fertile cultures for psychopathologies to grow in. (This is Barber's only real mention of what might be considered a third, equally important component of the psychological presidency: the rarefied, court-like atmosphere—so well described in George Reedy's *The Twilight of the Presidency*²⁹—that surrounds presidents and allows those whose psychological constitutions so move them to seal themselves off from harsh political realities.)

Barber's alternative to performance-based analysis—namely, a study of the candidate's "first independent political success," or "fips," in which a personal formula for success in politics was discovered—is not very helpful either. How, for example, is one to tell which "fips" was first? According to Barber's appropriately broad definition of *political*, Johnson's first success was not his election to Congress but his work as a student assistant to his college president. Hoover's

was his incumbency as student body treasurer at Stanford. Sorting through a candidate's life with the thoroughness necessary to determine the "fips" may or may not be an essential task. But it is clearly not a straightforward one.

Some scholars question not only the technical basis or practical applicability of Barber's psychological theory of presidential behavior but also the importance of psychological explanation itself. Psychology appears to be almost everything to Barber, as this statement from his research design for *The Presidential Character* reveals:

What is de-emphasized in this scheme? Everything which does not lend itself to the production of potentially testable generalizations about presidential behavior. Thus we shall be less concerned with the substance or content of particular issues . . . less concerned [for distant phenomena, such as relationships among other political actors affecting events without much reference to the president, public opinion, broad economic or historical trends, etc.—except insofar as these enter into the president's own approach to decision-making].³⁰

But is personality all that matters? Provocative though it may be, Barber's theory seems to unravel even as he applies it. A "healthy" political personality turns out not to be a guarantor of presidential success: Barber classed Ford, Carter, and Bush early in their presidencies as active-positives, for example. Carter, in fact, seemed to take flexibility—a virtue characteristic of active-positives—to such an extreme that it approached vacillation and inconsistency, almost as if in reading *The Presidential Character* he had learned its lessons too well.

Not, as Table 7.2 shows, does Barber's notion of psychological unsuitability seem to correspond to failure in office. The ranks of the most successful presidents in three recent surveys by historians include some whom Barber classified as active-positives (Jefferson, Truman, and Franklin Roosevelt), but an equal number of active-negatives (Wilson, Lyndon Johnson, and John Adams), and others whom Barber labeled passive-negatives (Washington and Eisenhower).³¹ The most perverse result of classifying presidents by this standard involves Abraham Lincoln, whom Jeffrey Tulis, correctly applying Barber's theory, found to be an active-negative.³²

Hargrove finds the active-positive category equally unhelpful because

active-positive presidents vary so as individuals that the category lacks the capacity to analyze and explain actions of presidential leadership. A schema that puts Franklin Roosevelt and Jimmy Carter in the same cell tells us that they shared high self-esteem and the capacity to learn and adapt to circumstances, but it says nothing

Table 7.2. "Great" Presidents and Barber's Character Typology

	Positive	Negative
Active	Thomas Jefferson Franklin Roosevelt Harry Truman	John Adams Woodrow Wilson Lyndon Johnson [Abraham Lincoln]
Passive		George Washington Dwight Eisenhower

Note: For purposes of this table, a "great" president is defined as one who ranked among the first ten in at least one of these three polls of historians: Steve Neal, "Our Best and Worst Presidents," *Chicago Tribune Magazine*, January 10, 1982, 9-18; Robert K. Murray and Tim H. Benson, *Greatness in the White House: Rating the Presidents*, Washington through Center (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1985), and David L. Porter, letter to author, January 15, 1982. Four others who achieved this ranking (Jackson, Polk, T. Roosevelt, and McKinley) are not included because Barber did not classify them according to his typology. Lincoln's name is bracketed because Jeffrey Tulis classified him using Barber's typology.

ing about the great differences in political skill between them or the psychological bases for such differences.³³

One could raise similar doubts about categories that lump together Harding and Reagan (passive-positive) or Coolidge and Eisenhower (passive-negative).

Clearly, personality is not all that matters in the presidency. As Tulis notes, Lincoln's behavior as president can be explained much better by his political philosophy and skills than by his personality. Similarly, one need not resort to psychology to explain the failures of active-negatives Hoover and, in the latter years of his presidency, Lyndon Johnson. Hoover's unbending opposition to instituting federal relief in the face of the depression may have stemmed more from ideological beliefs than psychological rigidity; Johnson's refusal to change the administration's policy in Vietnam could be interpreted as the action of a self-styled consensus leader trying to steer a moderate course between hawks who wanted full-scale military involvement and doves who wanted unilateral withdrawal.³⁴ These presidents' actions were ineffective, but not necessarily irrational.

The theoretical and practical criticisms mentioned here are important, and they do not exhaust the list. (Observer bias is one. Since Barber's published writings provide no clear checklist of criteria by which to type candidates, subjectivity is absolutely inherent.) But they should not blind us to his major contributions in *The Presidential Character*: a concentration (albeit excessive) on the importance of presidential personality in explaining presidential behavior, a sensitivity to personality's role as a variable (power does not always

corrupt; nor does the office always make the man), and a boldness in approaching the problems voters face in predicting what candidates will be like if elected.

Public Psychology

The second side of the psychological presidency—the public's side—is Barber's concern in *The Pulse of Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age*. The book is about elections, those occasions when, because citizens are deciding who will fill the presidential office, they presumably feel (presidential deaths aside) their emotional attachment to it most deeply. Again Barber presents us with a typology: The public's election moods come in three varieties: *conflict* ("we itch for adventure... [a] blood-and-guts political contest"), *conscience* ("the call goes out for a revival of social conscience, the restoration of the constitutional covenant"), and *conciliation* ("the public yearns for solace, for domestic tranquility").³⁵ This time the types appear in recurring order as well, over a twelve-year cycle.

Barber's question in *The Pulse of Politics*—what is "the swirl of emotions" with which Americans surround the presidency?—is as important and original as the questions he posed in *The Presidential Character*. But again, his answer is as puzzling as it is provocative. Although Barber's theory applies only to American presidential elections in this century, he seems to feel that the psychological "pulse" has beaten deeply, if softly, in all humankind for all time. Barber finds conflict, conscience, and conciliation in the "old sagas" of ancient peoples and in "the psychological paradigm that dominates the modern age: the ego instrument for coping with the struggles of the external world [conflict]; the *superego*, warning against harmful violations [conscience]; the *id*, longing after the thrill and ease of sexual satisfaction [conciliation]."³⁶ He finds it firmly reinforced in American history. Conflict is reflected in our emphasis on the war story ("In isolated America, the warmakers repeatedly confronted the special problem of arousing the martial spirit against distant enemies.... Thus our history vibrates with talk about war"). Conscience is displayed in America's sense of itself as an instrument of divine providence ("our conscience has never been satisfied by government as a mere practical arrangement"). Conciliation shows up in our efforts to live with each other in a heterogeneous "nation of nationalities." In the twentieth century, Barber argues, these three themes became the controlling force in the political psychology of the American electorate, so controlling, in fact, that every presidential election since the conflict of 1900 has fit its place within the cycle (conscience

corrupt; nor does the office always make the man), and a boldness in approaching the problems voters face in predicting what candidates will be like if elected.

in 1904, conciliation in 1908, conflict again in 1912, and so on). What caused the pulse to start beating so strongly, he feels, was the rise of national mass media.

The modern newspaper came first, just before the turn of the century. "In a remarkable historical conjunction," writes Barber, "the sudden surge into mass popularity of the American daily newspaper coincided with the Spanish-American War." Since war stories sold papers, daily journalists also wrote about "politics as war"—that is, conflict. In the early 1900s national mass circulation magazines arrived on the scene, taking their cues from the Progressive reformers who dominated the politics of that period. "The 'muckrakers'—actually positive thinkers out to build America, not destroy reputations"—wrote of "politics as a moral enterprise," an enterprise of conscience. Then came the broadcast media, radio in the 1920s and television in the 1950s. What set them apart was their commercial need to reach not just a wide audience but the widest possible audience. "Broadcasting aimed to please, wrapping politics in fun and games . . . conveying with unmatched reach and power its core message of conciliation."

As for the cyclic pulse, the recurring appearance of the three public moods in the same order, Barber suggests that the dynamic is internal: each type of public mood generates the next. After a conflict election ("a battle for power . . . a rousing call to arms"), a reaction sets in. Conscience calls for "the cleansing of the temple of democracy." But "the troubles do not go away," and four years later "the public yearns for solace," or conciliation. After another four years, Barber claims, "the time for a fight will come around again," and so on.

In *The Pulse of Politics*, difficulties arise not in applying the theory (a calendar will do: if it's 1996, this must be a conflict election), but in the theory itself. Barber needs an even more secure intellectual foundation here than in his character theory, for this time he not only classifies all presidential elections into three types but also asserts that they will recur in a fixed order. Once again, however, one finds no footnotes: if Barber is grounding his theory in external sources, then it is impossible to tell—and hard to imagine—what they are. Nor does the theory stand up sturdily under its own weight. If, for example, radio and television are agents of conciliation, why did we not have fewer conciliating elections before they became our dominant political media and more since? Perhaps that is why some of the postdictions to which Barber's theory leads are as questionable as they are easy to make: Did conflict really typify the (by most accounts) placid Reagan-Mondale election in 1984, conscience the meandering 1988 contest between Bush and Dukakis, or conciliation the bitterly fought election between Clinton, Bush, and Perot in 1992?

The most interesting criticism pertinent to Barber's pulse theory, however, was made in 1972 by a political scientist concerned with the public's presidential psychology, which he described as a "climate of expectations" that "shifts and changes." This scholar wrote:

Wars, depressions, and other national events contribute to that change, but there is also a rough cycle, from an emphasis on action (which begins to look too political) to an emphasis on legitimacy (the moral uplift of which creates its own strains) to an emphasis on reassurance. And rest (which comes to seem like drift) and back to action again. One need not be astrological about it.

A year earlier this same scholar had written that although "the mystic could see the series . . . marching in fateful repetition beginning in 1900 . . . the pattern is too astrological to be convincing." Careful readers will recognize the identity between the cycles of action-legitimacy-reassurance and conflict-conscience-conciliation. Clever ones will realize that the passages above were written by James David Barber.²⁸

Person, Mood, and the Psychological Presidency

There is, in fact, a good deal about the public's political psychology sprinkled through *The Presidential Character*, and the more of it one discovers, the more curious things get. Most significant is the brief concluding chapter, "Presidential Character and the Moods of the Eighth Decade" (reprinted in the three subsequent editions of the book, most recently in 1992), which contains Barber's bold suggestion of a close fit between the two sides of his model. For each type of public psychological climate, Barber posits a "resonant" type of presidential personality. This seems to be a central point in his theory of the presidency: "Much of what [a president] is remembered for," he argues, "will depend on the fit between the dominant forces in his character and the dominant feelings in his constituency." Further, "the dangers of discord in that resonance are severe."²⁹

What is the precise nature of this fit? When the public cry is for action (conflict), Barber argues, "it comes through loudest to the active-negative type, whose inner struggle between aggression and control resonates with the popular plea for toughness. . . . [The active-negative's] temptation to stand and fight receives wide support from the culture." In the public's reassurance (conciliation) mood, he writes, "they want a friend," a passive-positive. As for the "appeal for a moral cleansing of the Presidency," or legitimacy (conscience), Barber suggests that it "resonates with the passive-negative character in its

emphasis on *not doing* certain things." This leaves the active-positive, Barber's president for all seasons. * Blessed with a "character firmly rooted in self-recognition and self-love," Barber's "active-positive can not only *perform* lovingly or aggressively or with detachment, he can *feel* those ways."⁹⁹

What Barber first offered in *The Presidential Character*, then, was the foundation for a model of the psychological presidency that was not only two-sided but integrated as well, one in which the "tuning, the resonance—or lack of it"—between the public's "climate of expectations" and the president's personality "sets in motion the dynamic of his Presidency." He concentrated on the personally half of his model in *The Presidential Character*, then firmed it up and filled in the other half—the public's—in *The Pulse of Politics*. And here is where things become especially curious. Most authors, when they complete a multivolume opus, trumpet their accomplishment. Barber does not. In fact, one finds in *The Pulse of Politics* no mention at all of presidential character, of public climates of expectations, or of "the resonance—or lack of it"—between them.⁴⁰

At first blush, this seems doubly strange, because there is a strong surface fit between the halves of Barber's model. As Table 7.3 indicates, in the twenty-two elections since Taft's in 1908 (Barber did not type twentieth-century presidents before Taft), presidential character and public mood resonated fifteen times. The exceptions—active-negative Wilson's election in the conscience year of 1916, passive-negative Coolidge's in conflictual 1924, active-negative Hoover's in the conscience election of 1928, passive-negative Eisenhower's in the conciliating election of 1956, active-negative Johnson's in conscience-oriented 1964, active-negative Nixon's in conciliating 1968, and passive-positive Reagan's in conflict-dominated 1984—perhaps could be explained by successful campaign image management, an argument that would also support Barber's view of the media's power in presidential politics. In that case, a test of Barber's model would be: Did these "inappropriate" presidents lose the public's support when it found out what they were really like after the election? In every presidency but those of Coolidge, Eisenhower, and Reagan, the answer would have been yes.

On closer inspection, however, it also turns out that in every case but these, the presidents whose administrations were unsuccessful were active-negatives, who, Barber tells us, will fail for reasons that have nothing to do with the public mood. As for the model's overall success rate of fifteen out of twenty-two, it includes nine elections that were won by active-positives, who, he says, resonate with every public mood. A good hand in a wild-card game is not necessarily a good hand in straight poker: Barber's success rate in the elections not won by

Table 7.3. Resonance of Character Type and Public Mood in Presidential Elections, 1908–1992

Year	Public mood	Election	
		"Resonant" character types	Winning Presidential Candidate
1908	Conciliation	Passive-positive (Active-positive)	Taft
1912	Conflict	Active-negative (Active-positive)	Wilson
1916	Conscience	Passive-negative (Active-positive)	Wilson
1920	Conciliation	Passive-positive (Active-positive)	Harding
1924	Conflict	Active-negative (Active-positive)	Coolidge
1928	Conscience	Passive-negative (Active-positive)	Hoover
1932	Conciliation	Passive-positive (Active-positive)	Roosevelt
1936	Conflict	Active-negative (Active-positive)	Roosevelt
1940	Conscience	Active-negative (Active-positive)	Roosevelt
1944	Conciliation	Passive-negative (Active-positive)	Roosevelt
1948	Conflict	Active-positive (Active-positive)	Truman
1952	Conscience	Active-negative (Active-positive)	Eisenhower
1956	Conciliation	Passive-negative (Active-positive)	Eisenhower
1960	Conflict	Active-positive (Active-positive)	Kennedy
1964	Conscience	Active-negative (Active-positive)	Johnson
1968	Conciliation	Passive-negative (Active-positive)	Nixon
1972	Conflict	Active-positive (Active-positive)	Nixon
1976	Conscience	Active-negative (Active-positive)	Carter
1980	Conciliation	Passive-negative (Active-positive)	Reagan
1984	Conflict	Active-positive (Active-positive)	Reagan
1988	Conscience	Active-negative (Active-positive)	Bush
1992	Conciliation	Passive-negative (Active-positive)	Clinton

active-positives is only six of thirteen. In the case of conscience elections, only once did a representative of the resonant type (passive-negative) win, whereas purportedly less suitable active-negatives won three times.

Barber's Prescriptions

In *The Presidential Character* and *The Pulse of Politics* Barber developed a suggestive and relatively complete model of the psychological presidency. Why he has failed even to acknowledge the connection between the theories in each book, much less present them as a unified whole, remains unclear. Perhaps he feared that the lack of fit between his mood and personality types—the public and presidential components—would have distracted critics from his larger points.

In any event, the theoretical and predictive elements of Barber's theory of the presidency are sufficiently provocative to warrant him a hearing for his prescriptions for change. Barber's primary goal for the psychological presidency is that it be "de-psychopathologized." He wants to keep active-negatives out of the White House and put healthy active-positives in. He wants the public to become the master of its own political fate, breaking out of its electoral mood cycle, which is essentially a cycle of psychological dependency. Freed of their inner chains, the president and the public, Barber claims, will be able to forge a "creative politics" or "politics of persuasion," as he has variously dubbed it. Just what this kind of politics would be like is not clear, but apparently it would involve greater sensitivity on the part of both presidents and citizens to the ideas of the other.⁴¹

It will not surprise readers to learn that Barber, by and large, dismisses constitutional reform as a method for achieving his goals: if the presidency is as shaped by psychological forces as he says it is, then institutional tinkering will be, almost by definition, beside the point.⁴² Change, to be effective, will have to come in the hearts and minds of people: in the information they get about politics, the way they think about it, and the way they feel about what they think. Because of this, Barber believes, the central agent of change will have to be the most pervasive—media journalism—and its central channel, the coverage of presidential elections.⁴³

It is here, in his prescriptive writings, that Barber is on most solid ground, here that his answers are as good as his questions. Unlike many media critics, he does not assume imperiously that the sole purpose of newspapers, magazines, and television is to elevate the masses. Barber recognizes that the media is made up of commercial enterprises that must sell papers and attract view-

ers. He recognizes, too, that the basic format of news coverage is the story, not the scholarly treatise. His singular contribution is his argument that the media can improve the way it does all of these things at the same time, that better election stories will attract bigger audiences in more enlightening ways.

The first key to better stories, Barber argues, is greater attention to the candidates. Election coverage that ignores the motivations, developmental histories, and basic beliefs of its protagonists is as lifeless as dramas or novels would be if they neglected these crucial human attributes. Such coverage is also uninformative: elections, after all, present choices among people, and as Barber has shown, the kinds of people candidates are influences the kinds of presidents they would be. Good journalism, according to Barber, would "focus on the person as embodying his historical development, playing out a character born and bred in another place, connecting an old identity with a new persona—the stuff of intriguing drama from Joseph in Egypt on down. That can be done explicitly in biographical stories."⁴⁴

Barber is commendably diffident here; he does not expect reporters to master and apply his own character typology. But he does want them to search the candidates' lives for patterns of behavior, particularly the rigidity that is characteristic of active-negatives. (Of all behavior patterns, rigidity, he feels, "is probably the easiest one to spot and the most dangerous one to elect.")⁴⁵ With public interest ever high in "people" stories and psychology, Barber probably is right in thinking that this kind of reporting would not only inform readers but engage their interest as well.

Press coverage of the 1988 election bears out Barber's expectation. During the nomination stage of the campaign, the "character" issue drove two Democratic candidates from the field, much to the relief of most political leaders and (eventually) most voters. Former senator Gary Hart's extramarital escapades, which were revealed by the *Miami Herald*, were politically harmful less because of his moral weakness than because of the recklessness the incidents typified in his character.

Similarly, serious doubts were raised about Sen. Joseph Biden's intellectual and personal depth when the press discovered that he had lied to voters about his success in school and then had tried to pass off stories from an autobiographical speech by a British politician as if they were drawn from his own life. On the Republican side, Sen. Robert Dole's candidacy self-destructed when, in snarling "Tell him to stop lying about my record" to George Bush on live network television, he opened up for public display the volatile temper and resentments that Washington insiders had long seen in his character. As for Bush,

he triumphed in part because he was able to lay to rest the so-called wimp factor—that is, the suspicion that he was too weak to be a successful president.

In a curious way, the 1992 election bore out Barber as well. To be sure, the concerns about character that were expressed during that campaign centered on one candidate, Clinton, and were moral rather than psychological—the opposite of what Barber had intended. Clinton's truthfulness and fidelity were first called into question when an Arkansas acquaintance, Jennifer Flowers, publicly charged that she and Clinton had enjoyed a long-standing extramarital affair while he was governor (Clinton denied the charge but conceded that he and his wife had endured some marital problems in the past.) Soon after, letters in Clinton's own hand were published suggesting that he had dodged the draft during the Vietnam War. In contrast to their severe response to the candidates whose psychological character was questioned in 1988, however, reporters and voters overcame their doubts about Clinton's moral character and elected him—an active-positive, in Barber's reckoning—as president.

Engaging readers' interest is Barber's second key to better journalism. He finds reporters and editors notably, sometimes belligerently, ignorant of their audiences, quoting Richard Salant of CBS News: "I really don't know and I'm not interested. Our job is to give people not what they want, but what we decide they ought to have." Barber suggests that what is often lost in such a stance is an awareness of what voters need to make voting decisions, namely, information about who the candidates are and what they believe. According to a study of network evening news coverage of the 1972 election campaign, which he cites, almost as much time was devoted to the polls, strategies, rallies, and other "horse-race" elements of the election as to the candidates' personal qualifications and issue stands combined. As Barber notes, "The viewer tuning in for facts to guide his choice would, therefore, have to pick his political nuggets from a great gravel pile of political irrelevancy."⁶ Critics who doubt the public's interest in long, fleshed-out stories about what candidates think, what they are like, and what great problems they would face as president would do well to check the quarter-century of ratings for CBS's *60 Minutes*.

An electorate whose latent but powerful interest in politics is engaged by the media will become an informed electorate because it wants to, not because it is supposed to. This is Barber's strong belief. So sensible a statement of the problem is this, and so attractive a vision of its solution, that one can forgive him for cluttering it up with types and terminologies.

Notes

1. "Candidate on the Couch," *Time*, June 19, 1972, 15-17; James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972); a second edition was published in 1977; a third edition in 1985, and a fourth edition in 1992. Unless otherwise indicated, the quotations cited in this essay appear in all four editions, with page numbers drawn from the first edition.
2. Hugh Sides, "The Active-Positive Searching," *Time*, October 4, 1976, 23.
3. "After Eight Months in Office—How Ford Rates Now," *U.S. News & World Report*, April 28, 1975, 28.
4. David S. Broder, "Carter Would Like to Be an Active Positive," *Washington Post*, July 16, 1976, A12.
5. James David Barber, "An Active-Positive Character," *Time*, January 3, 1977, 17.
6. Hugh Sides, "A Revolution Is Under Way," *Time*, March 3, 1980, 20.
7. "Cycle Races," *Time*, May 19, 1980, 29.
8. Paul J. Quirk, "What Do We Know and How Do We Know It? Research on the Presidency," in *Political Science: Looking to the Future*, ed. William J. Grotty and Alan D. Monroe, vol. 4 (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 52. Psychologists, on the other hand, recently have been paying more attention to the presidency. See, for example, Dean Keith Simonton, *Why Presidents Succeed: A Political Psychology of Leadership* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), and Harold M. Zullo, Gabriele Oettingen, Christopher Peterson, and Martin E. P. Seligman, "Personistic Explanatory Style in the Historical Record," *American Psychologist* 43 (September 1988): 673-681.
9. Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 6-8.
10. The phrase is Alexander Hamilton's. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, with an introduction by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), nos. 70, 423.
11. Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), chap. 1; and Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 358.
12. Marcus Cunliffe, *George Washington: Man and Monument* (New York: New American Library, 1958), 15.
13. Max Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Conventions of 1787*, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 1:65.
14. Jeffrey Tulis, "On Presidential Character," in *The Presidency in the Constitutional Order*, ed. Jeffrey Tulis and Joseph M. Bessette (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981), 287.
15. *Federalist*, nos. 71 and 72, 431-440.
16. *Federalist*, no. 64, 396.
17. See, for example, James David Barber, "Adult Identity and Presidential Style: The Rhetorical Emphasis," *Daedalus* 97 (Summer 1968): 938-968; Barber, "Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two 'Weak' Presidents," *Journal of Social Issues* 24 (July 1968): 51-80; Barber, "The President and His Friends" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1969); and Barber, "The Interplay of Presidential Character and Style: A Paradigm and Five Illustrations," in *A Source Book for the Study of Personality and Politics*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner (Chicago: Markham, 1971), 383-408.

18. Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: Wiley, 1960), 185.
19. Erwin C. Hargrove, *The Power of the Modern Presidency* (New York: Knopf, 1974), 33.
20. See, for example, Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); and John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York: Wiley, 1973).
21. Paul R. Sheatsley and Jacob J. Feldman, "The Assassination of President Kennedy: Public Reactions," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 28 (Summer 1964): 189-215.
22. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes from Barber in this section are from *The Presidential Character*, chap. 1.
23. *Ibid.*, 145, 206. In more recent writings, Barber's assessment of presidential passivity has grown more harsh. A passive-positive, for example, "may . . . preside over the cruelest of regimes." *Presidential Character*, 3d ed., 529-530.
24. Barber, *Presidential Character*, 12.
25. Thirteen years after *The Presidential Character* was first published, in an appendix to the third edition, Barber described a variety of works to show that his character types "are not a product of one author's fevered imagination" but rather keep "popping up in study after study." In truth, most of the cited works are not scholarly studies of psychological character at all, nor are they claimed to be by their authors.
26. Alexander George, "Assessing Presidential Character," *World Politics* 26 (January 1974): 234-282.
27. *Ibid.* George argues that Nixon's behavior was not of a kind that Barber's theory would lead one to predict.
28. Barber, *Presidential Character*, 99.
29. George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York: New American Library, 1970). See also Bruce Buchanan, *The Presidential Experience: What the Office Does to the Man* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978).
30. James David Barber, "Coding Scheme for Presidential Biographies," January 1968, mimeographed, 3.
31. The surveys are reported in Steve Neal, "Our Best and Worst Presidents," *Chicago Tribune Magazine*, January 10, 1982, 9-18; Robert K. Murray and Tim H. Blessing, *Greatness in the White House: Rating the Presidents, Washington through Carter* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1988); and David L. Porter, letter to author, January 15, 1982.
32. Tullis, "On Presidential Character."
33. Erwin C. Hargrove, "Presidential Personality and Leadership Style," in *Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches*, ed. George C. Edwards III, John H. Kessel, and Bert Rockman (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 96.
34. Erwin C. Hargrove, "Presidential Personality and Revisionist Views of the Presidency," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 17 (November 1973): 819-836.
35. James David Barber, *The Pulse of Politics: Electing Presidents in the Media Age* (New York: Norton, 1980). Unless otherwise indicated, all quotes from Barber in this section are from chapters 1 and 2.
36. The first quote appears in *The Presidential Character*, 9; the second in "Interplay of Presidential Character and Style," n. 2.
37. Barber, *Presidential Character*, 446.
38. *Ibid.*, 446, 448, 451.
39. *Ibid.*, 243.
40. Barber did draw a connection between the public's desire for conciliation and its choice of a passive-positive in the 1980 election: "Sometimes people want a fighter in the White House and sometimes a saint. But the time comes when all we want is a friend, a pal, a guy to reassure us that the story is going to come out all right. In 1980, that need found just the right promise in Ronald Reagan, the smiling American." James David Barber, "Reagan's Sheer Personal Likability Faces Its Sternest Test," *Washington Post*, January 20, 1981, 8.
41. James David Barber, "Tone-Deaf in the Oval Office," *Saturday Review/World*, January 12, 1974, 10-14.
42. James David Barber, "The Presidency after Watergate," *World*, July 31, 1973, 16-19.
43. Barber, *Pulse of Politics*, chap. 15. For other statements of his views on how the press should cover politics and the presidency, see James David Barber, ed., *Race for the Presidency: The Media and the Nominating Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), chaps. 5-7; Barber, "Not Quite the New York Times What Network News Should Be," *Washington Monthly*, September 1979, 14-21; and Barber, *Politics by Humans: Research on American Political Leadership* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), chaps. 17-18.
44. Barber, *Race for the Presidency*, 145.
45. *Ibid.*, 171, 162-164.
46. *Ibid.*, 174, 182-183.